Political Opportunism and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy in Election-year Recessions by Bohn, Frank & Veiga, F.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/207057
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-12-31 and may be subject to
change.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL
POLICY IN ELECTION-YEAR RECESSIONS
FRANK BOHN and FRANCISCO JOSÉ VEIGA∗
Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit
not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of
economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact
of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that
a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is
expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy
for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior
is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more
and significantly so, when a recession is expected. (JEL D72, E62, H62)
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been accepted as a stylized fact that
political budget cycles (PBCs) are context-
conditional,1 that is, do not happen under all cir-
cumstances.2 They do, however, occur in coun-
tries with fiscal or government intransparencies
or lack of media freedom (Alt and Lassen 2006a,
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1. The term was coined by Franzese Jr. (2002). A sur-
vey of a growing literature is provided by de Haan and
Klomp (2013).Meta-analyses obtain conflicting results:Man-
don and Cazals (2018) question the existence of political bud-
get cycles altogether; Philips (2016) finds support for context-
conditionality.
2. Pelzman (1992) even argues that voters may actually
be fiscally conservative and punish governments for over-
spending, instead of exonerating or even welcoming addi-
tional expenditure or transfers. There is also some evidence
pointing in that direction, at least for Israel (Brender 2003)
and for Germany (Hayo and Neumeier 2017).
2006b; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Veiga,
Veiga, and Morozumi 2017), in developing coun-
tries (Block 2002; Schuknecht 1996, 2000; Shi
and Svensson 2006 Vergne 2009), or in new
democracies (Brender and Drazen 2005). They
are also affected by the political system (Chang
2008; Streb, Lema, and Torrens 2009) and/or the
electoral system (Aidt and Mooney 2014).
What has not been studied is the question of
how opportunistic governments respond to the
regular business cycle, in particular to expected
changes in economic growth. Intuitively, we
could think, for instance, of a different bud-
get deficit response in election years versus
off-election years. In off-election years the
ABBREVIATIONS
AR: Autoregressive
ARIMA: Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
ARIMAX: Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
with additional explanatory variables
DGAL: Portuguese Directorate General of Local
Authorities
FOC: First-Order Condition
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MA: Moving Average
MAE: Mean Absolute Error
ME: Mean Error
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
PBC: Political Budget Cycle
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error
WEO: World Economic Outlook
2058
Economic Inquiry
(ISSN 0095-2583)
Vol. 57, No. 4, October 2019, 2058–2081
doi:10.1111/ecin.12813
Online Early publication June 11, 2019
© 2019 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Western Economic Association International.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
BOHN & VEIGA: POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND RECESSIONS 2059
government might consider a fully blown Keyne-
sian expansion on the one hand, or precautionary
spending cuts or tax increases on the other hand
(which would lead to a deficit reduction, if the
negative growth expectations did not material-
ize). In election years, the incumbent is always
worried about reelection chances. Brender and
Drazen (2008) find that low growth affects
reelection prospects at least in less-developed
countries and new democracies. Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier (2000) find similar effects in some
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) democracies. One would
think, therefore, that an expected recession in
an election year would prompt the government
to counteract or, at least, to limit the expected
reduced reelection probability by increasing its
fiscal manipulation.
This paper captures this idea in a career con-
cerns model which makes use of earlier analyt-
ical models, but with significant modifications.
It uses the insight of Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff
and Sibert (1988) that voters want to vote for the
politician with the higher expected competence
in the future (which amounts to prospective vot-
ing when the government is opportunistic). As
suggested by Lohmann (1998) voters are unin-
formed about the incumbent’s competence which
incumbents, too, can only judge once a new task
has been tackled more or less successfully. Shi
and Svensson (2006) use the same setting, but
apply it to fiscal policy, in particular to the gov-
ernment’s choice of the deficit level. The model
in this paper extends their framework to allow for
economic growth and inertia in voter perceptions
of economic growth. It can be shown that the
government’s realistic forecast for a recession3
prompts the government to expand its manipula-
tion in election years, that is, to produce counter-
cyclical policy. Since we can show it in a careers
concern model which does not attribute any eco-
nomic benefit to countercyclicality, the expansion
cannot be the result of Keynesian policies, but
must be caused by political opportunism.
The main finding of the theoretical model is
supported by evidence from Portuguese munici-
palities. The empirical section shows that there
is indeed a countercyclical policy effect when
realistic forecasts predict negative growth or
unusually low growth (below certain percentiles)
3. Henceforth, we use the word recession in a loose,
nontechnical sense. In the theoretical model, it means negative
growth (relative to trend output). In the empirical part, we use
several specifications for the “recession” variable including
negative growth (relative to the previous year).
in election years. The result is robust to using the
primary deficit or the fiscal deficit as the depen-
dent variable, to taking national government
or International Monetary Fund (IMF) growth
forecasts, to including or not a series of control
variables, to controlling for time-specific effects
in several alternative ways, to restricting the sam-
ple in different ways, and to clustering standard
errors in alternative ways. Similar results are also
obtained when forecasts of unemployment rates
are used instead of growth forecasts.
The theoretical analysis incorporates the idea
that voters do not have fully rational expectations.
A reduction in growth is perceived, but under-
estimated. Voters will attribute cuts in expendi-
tures, at least partially, to government incompe-
tence rather than the dire economic conditions.
Therefore, the government cannot cut expendi-
tures one-for-one, if it does not want to damage
its reelection chances too much. Hence the gov-
ernment countercyclically expands spending in
recessionary election years for opportunistic rea-
sons. The main countercyclicality result would
only vanish under a very unlikely scenario; voters
would have to show minimal growth perception
and maximal deficit adjustment inertia, that is,
they would have to be able to foresee the reces-
sion 100%, but would believe that this has abso-
lutely no effect on the deficit. If either condition
is violated, the countercyclicality result holds.
Our results are thus based on moving away
from full rationality (in the sense of rational
expectations). Instead, we postulate that vot-
ers’ perception of economic developments lag
behind.4 Our claim is that voter beliefs are not
fully responsive to economic forecasts, whereas
the government is better able to make use of
these forecasts. Although voters may be aware of
the latest gross domestic product (GMP) growth
forecasts released by the national government
and/or by international agencies such as the
4. Theremay be other behavioural assumptions that could
potentially produce the countercyclicality result shown by the
data. However, finding the most suited alternative behavioral
assumption is beyond the scope of this paper.We do, however,
note that our assumption has clear advantages over fully
rational expectations. First, it does allow us to obtain our main
result (Proposition 1), whereas rational expectations would
not. Second, it is consistent with the well-established stylized
fact that opportunistic behaviour increases the incumbent’s
reelection chances (see discussion thereof after equation 12);
in Lohmann (1998) and Shi and Svensson (2006) type rational
expectations models this is not so; in Rogoff (1990) and
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), it is only competent politicians
who can signal their competence and thereby increase their
reelection chances. Third, it better captures inertia in voters’
perception found in Portugal—as argued below.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics on Expectation Inertia
Variables Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Coefficient of
Variation (Standard
Deviation/Mean)
Real GDP growth (actual) 0.85 2.28 −4.03 4.79 2.67
Government’s GDP growth forecast 1.36 1.48 −2.80 3.75 1.09
IMF’s GDP growth forecast 1.29 1.37 −1.84 3.74 1.06
Consumer expectations regarding the
economic situation of the country in the
next 12months
−21.78 16.98 −56.50 3.63 −0.78
Consumer Confidence Index −23.73 12.26 −48.84 −3.45 −0.52
Source: INE (Statistics Portugal), Ministry of Finance, and IMF.
IMF, OECD, or European Commission, they are
uncertain as to how those forecasts will affect
their lives and public finances. In fact, they
may have a greater tendency to expect things to
remain as they are.
This is particularly relevant when thinking in
terms of Portuguese municipalities. Since there
are no regional or municipal growth forecasts,
voters will find it hard to figure out how their local
economy will perform and howmunicipal budget
deficits will be affected. Given this uncertainty,
we assume some inertia in voters’ expectations.
This assumption is also supported by Table 1,
which reports descriptive statistics for actual
GDP growth, government’s growth forecasts for
the following year (taken from the national bud-
gets), IMF’s growth forecasts, consumer expec-
tations regarding the economic situation of the
country in the next 12months, and the Consumer
Confidence Index,5 from 1998 to 2015.
Table 1 clearly indicates that actual real GDP
growth rates are considerably more volatile than
government and IMF forecasts, and that these
are, in turn, more volatile than consumer expec-
tations. That is, Portuguese consumers/voters
exhibit greater inertia in their expectations than
the national government or the IMF, whose
growth forecasts are already much smoother than
actual real GDP growth rates.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections
II and III lay out the analytical model. Section
IV presents the propositions and discusses the
results. Section V describes the data and the
5. The Consumer Confidence Index is a composite mea-
sure based on the answers to five questions from the
Portuguese Consumer Survey, implemented by Portugal’s
National Statistics Institute (INE). The consumer expecta-
tions for the next 12 months are also an index measure.
Given the crises the Portuguese economy went through in
the twenty-first century both variables register negative values
during most of our sample period.
empirical model, while Section VI presents
and discusses the empirical findings. Section
VII concludes.
II. MODEL
The economy consists of n consumer-voters
and two consumer-politicians who could be the
running mayor and her challenger in Portuguese
municipalities. Voters’ expected utility depends
on discounted period utility which, in turn,
consists of additively separable economic utility
from a function in private goods consumption c
(with the standard concavity properties) and local
public goods L as well as a political utility com-
ponent (with weight α). θ could be interpreted
as the voter’s personal sympathy or ideological
preference and is uniformly distributed over
the interval [−1,1]; z takes the values − 1
2
, if
government a (say left wing) is in power, or 1
2
,
if government b (say right wing) is in power. A
voter experiences a positive political utility, if
her favourite party is in power; political utility
is smaller for more centrist voters. As we can
see later on, voters base their voting decision
on prospective utility; more centrist voters may,
therefore, be swayed to vote for the other party, if
they expect a higher economic utility from it. βi
is voter i’s discount factor. E is the expectations
operator. Here is the voters’ utility function:
Uit =
∞∑
s=t
(
βi
)s−t
Et
[
u
(
cs
)
+ Ls + αθizs
]
,(1)
i = 1, … , n.
There are only two parties (or possible coali-
tions) which are represented by an incumbent
(say, from party a, without limiting the general-
ity of the analysis) and a challenger b who run
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for office every alternate period. Their utility con-
sists of economic utility (analogous to the voter’s
utility) and an ego rent, if they are in office. βj
is party j’s discount factor. Hence politicians are
purely opportunistic:
Vjt =
∞∑
s=t
Wjs =
∞∑
s=t
(
βj
)s−t
Et
[
u
(
cs
)
+ Ls + IsXs
]
,
j = a, b;
Ir =
{
1 if in power in period r;
0 otherwise.
(2)
Everybody’s expected consumption depends
on expected after-tax income:
Ekt
[
ct
]
= Ekt
[
(1 − τ) εty
]
= (1 − 𝛕) 𝛆t,(3)
k = j, i.
Income deviates from trend output y (which
could also be interpreted as previous period
output or potential output) by a period-specific
expected growth shock εt. With y normalized
to 1, trend output is given by εt = ε = 1; values
of ε below 1 capture a recession, those above
1 a boom. The tax rate is assumed to remain
unchanged in an election period.6
The provision of local public goods is obtained
from the government budget constraint which
depends on expected growth. The government
expects to receive revenues on the basis of growth
shock εt and decides on a definite choice of deficit
levelDt which is the only government instrument
in the model. The government has to repay previ-
ous period deficitDt− 1 at interest rate rt− 1 which
is exogenous though not necessarily constant; it
is known by everybody and does not change with
the volume of the deficit (reflecting the situation
of Portuguese municipalities that are not allowed
to incur large debts). In addition, the magnitude
of L is affected by government competence ηjt.
(4) Lt = τεt + Dt −
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 + η
j
t.
Today’s competence ηt is made up of i.i.d.
shocks for this period as well as last period. It
6. Increasing taxes in an election period is extremely
unpopular. Increasing the provision of local public goods is
more effective than decreasing taxes. In addition, territorial
subdivisions like Portuguesemunicipalities often have limited
influence on their total tax revenue. Ignoring tax rate increases
could also be justified by making a formal argument as in Shi
and Svensson (2006). They obtain the optimal tax rate for
the “equilibrium without elections” and then use backward
induction in the two-period election cycle to argue that the
very same tax rate remains optimal.
captures the government’s efficiency which is not
known by the government prior to the local public
goods provision. Shocks μjt are modeled as ran-
dom variables with mean 0, distribution function
F
(
μjt
)
= F (•), and density function f
(
μjt
)
=
f (•) = F′ (•) which is (weakly) monotonously
increasing up to the mean.7 Here is the MA(1)
process for government competence:
(5) ηjt = μ
j
t + μ
j
t−1.
The timing of events is shown in Table 2.
At the beginning of election period t, voters
and incumbent a observe the realizations of
last period’s skills shock μat−1 and deficit Dt− 1.
In period t, the incumbent also observes the
(estimate for the) growth shock εt which allows
her to choose her optimal level for the deficit
Dt, thereby providing quantity Lt of local public
goods. Voters observe Lt, but have to form (dis-
torted) expectations about the growth shock, ε̂t,
and the incumbent’s optimal level for the deficit,
D̂t, because they exhibit belief inertia (which
is discussed further down; see Equations (13)
and (14)). On this basis, they determine their
expectations of skills shock, μ̂at , which would
influence the provision of local public goods
in (t+ 1), if the incumbent were reelected. Vot-
ers are prospective in that they base their voting
decision in period t on a comparison of utilities to
be expected from the incumbent and challenger
in period (t+ 1). Note that voters can make a
mistake in their expectation of the incumbent’s
competence in (t+ 1) because of two forms of
inertia: (1) they do not fully anticipate the deficit
policy by the incumbent and (2) they do not fully
anticipate an economic slump or boom.
In period (t+ 1), the winner of the election
receives ego rent X. Policy in (t+ 1) is no longer
dependent on voting though; hence either poli-
cymaker will repay the costly deficit and cut the
provision of local public goods. Voters anticipate
this, but cannot prevent it. Also note that the vot-
ing decision in election period t does not encom-
pass concerns for expected utility in t+ 2 because
the MA(1) nature of the competence process
makes incumbent and challenger indistinguish-
able then. Policymakers also do not include t+ 2
in their decision problem for choosing the opti-
mal level of Dt because they cannot affect their
7. For more unusual density functions (for instance, with
F′′
(
μat
)
< 0 for some μat ≤ 0), we could get ambiguous
results. However, the limiting case of F′′
(
μat
)
= 0 for some
μat ≤ 0 or even over the entire range (uniform distribution) is
acceptable.
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TABLE 2
The Timing of Events
Voters and incumbent a Voters:
observe: The winner of the period t elections takes
office and receives an ego rent.
- last period’s deficit - observe local public goods
Dt − i Lt
- the incumbent’s last period
skills
- form expectations of the incumbent’s
current period skills
μat−1
μ̂at The winner repays the deficit of the
previous period.
Incumbent a: (because they are inert-rational and
- observes growth (estimate) have beliefs on expected growth
εt ε̂t
- chooses deficit and expected deficit
Dt D̂t)
- and provides local public goods - and vote.
Lt .
Period t Period t+ 1
incumbent
decides
voters
vote
winner
decides
own utility or reelection chances in t+ 2. Hence
the model can be split into two-period cycles,
each consisting of an election period (period t)
and an off-election period (period t+ 1).
III. MODEL SOLUTION
The model is solved by maximizing the
incumbent a’s expected utility in t and (t+ 1)
which depends, for (t+ 1), on the incumbent’s
chance of winning the election which, in turn,
depends on all individuals’ probability of voting
for incumbent a. The logic of the solution is
explained here and details are provided in the
Appendix. Voters are prospective in that they
vote for the politician who they expect to deliver
a higher utility for them after the elections.8 Any
voter i expects average skills from the challenger
(ηbt+1 = 0), but has some idea of the incumbent’s
skills (ηat+1 = μ
a
t + μ
a
t+1) because the incumbent’s
fiscal policy choice in period t influences voter
i’s expectations of the incumbent’s current period
skills shock Eit
[
μat
]
. In Appendix A it is derived
(and, i.e., in our view, close to reality) that a voter
8. Prospective voting should not be confused with ratio-
nal expectations (which typically incorporates specific behav-
ior by politicians, for instance their partisanship in voting
models). In this paper, voting is determined by expected
competence which is affected by voters’ subjective beliefs.
Prospective voters only use their expectations of competence
for evaluating the future consequence of their votes; there is
no additional information about candidates because they are
purely opportunistic.
will vote for the incumbent, either if ideologies
coincide and the challenger is not likely to do a
better job (Eit
[
μat
]
≥ Eit
[
μbt
]
= 0) or if the voter’s
(positive) perception of government competence
makes up for the “wrong” ideological orientation
of the incumbent:
(6) Eit
[
μat
]
> αθi.
The incumbent’s probability of winning can
then be obtained as:
(7) Prob
{ [
Eit
[
μat
]
2α
+ 1
2
]
≥
1
2
}
.
The competence extraction mechanism, that
is, how a voter obtains Eit
[
μat
]
, is shown in
Appendix B. The basis is the government’s bud-
get constraint (4), here solved for μat :
(8)
μat = Lt − τεt − Dt +
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 − μat−1.
If voters knew everything, the provision
of local public goods, output growth, and the
government’s deficit decision (plus the tax rate,
debt repayment, and previous period skills),
they could infer true competence. Voters can
observe the provision of public goods, but do
not know output growth and the government’s
deficit choice. Their perception of government
competence μ̂at is, therefore:
Et
[
μat
]
= μ̂at = Lt − τε̂t − D̂t
+
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 − μat−1
BOHN & VEIGA: POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND RECESSIONS 2063
= Lt − τεt − Dt +
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 − μat−1
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
μat fromEquation (8)
+
[
τ
(
εt − ε̂t
)]
+
[
Dt − D̂t
]
;
Et
[
μat
]
= μ̂at = μ
a
t +
[
τ
(
εt − ε̂t
)](9)
+
[
Dt − D̂t
]
.
Note that voters credit the government with
above average competence (μ̂at > 0), if the gov-
ernment can increase the deficit by more than
what is expected by voters (Dt − D̂t > 0). This is
the standard manipulation argument. However,
if they underestimate a recession (εt < ε̂t < 0),
they believe in lower competence. We can
now rewrite the incumbent’s probability of
winning:
Probwin(10)
= Prob
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
μat +
[
τ
(
εt−ε̂t
)]
+
[
Dt−D̂t
]
2α
+1
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦≥
1
2
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
= Prob
{
μat ≥
[
τ
(
ε̂t − εt
)]
+
[
D̂t − Dt
]}
(11)
= 1 − F
[
τ
(
ε̂t − εt
)
+ D̂t − Dt
]
.(12)
If voters were modeled to have rational expec-
tations (without belief inertia), the probability
of winning could not be affected by govern-
ment manipulations in equilibrium. That is, how-
ever, contradicted by evidence presented by, for
instance, Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2011), Akhme-
dov and Zhuravskaya (2004), and Klomp and de
Haan (2013) who argue that government manip-
ulations do indeed positively affect reelection
chances. In addition, Boylan (2008) and Aidt,
Veiga, and Veiga (2011) find evidence that gov-
ernment manipulations increase, if the election
is closely contested, what Boylan calls a “close
election bias.”
The incumbent’s vote share is actually
increased if the right-hand side in the brace
of Equation (11) (i.e., the argument of the F
function in Equation (12)) becomes smaller
than zero. This happens if we incorporate in the
model an important behavioral trait that we find
in the real world; voters exhibit belief inertia, but
are otherwise quite sensible. Such inert-rational
voters could be described as follows9:
Eit
[
εt
]
= ε̂t = φε + (1 − φ) εt,(13)
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, for all i.
Eit
[
Dt
]
= D̂t = D + γτ
(
ε − ε̂t
)
,(14)
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, for all i.
Parameter φ captures voter growth percep-
tion inertia, that is, to what degree voters foresee
actual growth relative to growth of the previous
period. D captures the historical deficit experi-
ence and is part of the deficit inertia. D can be
interpreted as some kind of average of deficits
of previous periods or, more specifically, the last
period, that is, Dt− 1. The overall expected gov-
ernment deficit is then adjusted by the expected
revenue shortfall. Parameter γ< 1 depicts the
deficit adjustment inertia. For γ< 1, this adjust-
ment is incomplete, that is, there is additional
belief inertia in the voter’s expected deficit. Note
that, in contrast, the government chooses the
deficit and does not suffer from belief inertia
about growth.10
Inserting Equations (13) and (14) into
Equation (12) (see Appendix B) delivers
Probwin
(15)
= 1− F
[
τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ)
(
ε − εt
)
+ D − Dt
]
.
Here, we can see why the manipulation can
increase the winning probability. If growth
remains unchanged (ε = εt), it suffices for
the government to choose Dt > D in order to
9. The specification captures the effect of growth expec-
tations on deficit expectations. One could argue that the inter-
action goes in both directions, that is, also from expected
deficit to expected growth. If voters believed in more deficit
spending, should they not also expect that there is an expan-
sionary effect, that is, their growth expectations should go up?
If a (linear) effect of deficit expectations on growth expecta-
tions (13) is also incorporated, the qualitative results do not
change at all. Results can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
10. Obviously, this is a simplification. The idea is that
governments have access to growth forecasts which are used
because they give them an unbiased prediction of actual
growth (whereas voters are not fully aware of such forecasts
or do not fully incorporate them in their planning). In the
empirical model, we assume that the local government uses
estimated regional growth forecasts (based on national fore-
casts obtained from their own government and/or externally
from the IMF). We can even show that deviations of fore-
casted and actual ex post growth rates do not significantly
affect the government’s choice of deficit (see the first set of
results of Table E4 in Appendix E).
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raise reelection chances. In case of a boom,
this becomes easier; in case of a recession,
more difficult.
Hence, the incumbent a’s decision problem
can be simplified as follows (see Appendix C for
details; discount factor β can be ignored because
it does not affect the qualitative properties of the
model):
max
Dt
Vat = maxDt
V = max
Dt
Wat +W
a
t+1(16)
= max
Dt
u
(
(1 − τ) εt
)
+ Lt + X
+ u
(
(1 − τ) εt+1
)
+ Lt+1
+ Probwin X,
where
Lt = τεt + Dt −
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 + η
j
t;
Lt+1 = τεt+1 −
(
1 + rt
)
Dt + η
j
t+1.
The first-order condition (FOC) is:
1 −
(
1 + rt
)
+ F′[τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ)(17) (
ε − εt
)
+ D − D∗t ] X = 0
⇐⇒ rt = F′[•] X,
Since the second-order condition for a max-
imum holds, the FOC fully characterizes the
optimal deficit choice D∗t by the government.
The FOC is straightforward: the marginal loss
from a deficit, that is, the interest rate, must
equal the marginal gain, that is, the marginal
increase in the (winning) chance for obtaining
the ego rent. In other words, the government
benefits from raising the deficit because it can
impress upon voters that it is more competent
and, thereby, raise its reelection chances so that it
is more likely to enjoy the perks from staying in
office.
Having confirmed the existence of a budget
cycle, our main interest turns to studying the
effect of a perturbation of εt on D∗t , that is,
the change in government manipulation, if a
recession is looming in an election year. Note
that εt is the actual recession which is, however,
expected by the government. Furthermore, we
are interested in how the government’s optimal
deficit response to a recession is influenced
by the voters’ growth perception inertia φ
and deficit adjustment inertia γ. Some addi-
tional straightforward results are reported in
Appendix D.
IV. PROPOSITION AND DISCUSSION
The following proposition suggests a reason
for the incumbent to increase the magnitude of
her manipulations:
PROPOSITION 1. Recession (or Boom) Exp-
ectations. Imminent recession expectations
(lower εt in Equation (16)) increase the gov-
ernment’s optimal deficit at the equilibrium,
albeit underproportionally. (Analogously, boom
expectations decrease optimal deficits, albeit,
again, underproportionally.) Hence, there is a
countercyclical policy effect.
0 ≥
dD∗t
dεt
= −τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ) > −1.
Proof. Appendix D. ◾
Proposition 1 states the core result of the
paper. Deficits are already higher in election years
(normal PBC), but according to the proposition
even higher when a recession is expected for an
election year. If the incumbent government per-
ceives an economic downturn, it expects lower
revenues and will adjust its expenditures in order
to limit its expected (costly) additional deficit. So,
the deficit will not go up one-for-one with the
expected revenue shortfall caused by the expected
recession. Hence the “> −1” in the proposition.
However, the government will not cut expendi-
tures (for local public goods) one-for-one either,
unless voters equally adjust their expectations.
Hence the “0 ≥” in the proposition.11 Here is
the reason. With voter growth perception inertia
(φ> 0), a reduction in growth is perceived, but
underestimated. Therefore, voters will attribute
cuts in expenditures, at least partially, to govern-
ment incompetence rather than the dire economic
conditions. As a consequence, the government
cannot cut expenditures one-for-one, if it does
not want to damage its reelection chances too
11. A more complicated model could capture the effect
of the government’s deficit policy on growth. If deficit had
an expansionary effect, government revenues would go up
and more public goods could be provided. Hence deficit
would be more effective in convincing voters of government
competence. Nonetheless, the government would still resort
to deficit policies, especially in a recession when revenues
are reduced. Inert-rational voters would still attribute cuts in
public goods expenditures to incompetence, thus requiring the
government to compensate by increasing the deficit. It would
not have to be increased so much, but the mechanism would
be the same.
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much.12 Higher growth perception inertia (higher
φ) implies more government manipulation.
Voters’ deficit adjustment inertia (γ< 1)
works in the opposite direction and partially
offsets the growth perception inertia effect. If
voters think that the recession only has a limited
effect on the deficit (high deficit inertia, i.e., low
γ), they underestimate the deficit. Hence they
attribute a better provision of local public goods
to competence (rather than an increase in the
deficit), which raises the incumbent’s reelection
chances. As a consequence, the government
tends to limit its deficit in order to contain repay-
ment costs. Higher deficit adjustment inertia
(lower γ) implies less government manipulation.
This intuition is formalized in Corollary 1.
COROLLARY 1. Voter Inertia. The counter-
cyclical policy effect in Proposition 1 is increased
when the voter growth perception inertia goes
up (φ up), but decreased when the voter deficit
adjustment inertia goes up (γ down).
(i)
d
dD∗t
dεt
d’
= −τ (1 − γ) < 0, for γ < 1.
(ii)
d
dD∗t
dεt
dγ
= −τ (1 − φ) < 0, for φ < 1.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 1.
◾
The main countercyclicality13 result would
only vanish under a very unlikely scenario; vot-
ers would have to show minimal growth percep-
tion inertia (φ= 0) and maximal deficit adjust-
ment inertia (γ= 0), that is, they would have to
be able to foresee the recession 100%, but would
12. It is not straightforward how to incorporate fiscally
conservative voters in a political budget cycle model. One
possibility might be to include a punishment term for deficit
in voters’ utility function (1). However, that would have to
be based on the voters’ perception of the deficit. Would
voters then make allowances for bad economic conditions?
If not, any recession would make it harder for the government
to be reelected (because a higher [expected] deficit would
additionally be punished by fiscally conservative voters). That
should actually induce the government to manipulate even
more. In other words, modeling fiscal conservatism like that
would strengthen our model results.
13. Note that countercyclicality refers to higher spending
(for instance, on local public goods) during recessionary peri-
ods. It does not capture the Keynesian idea of stimulating the
economy. If this were included in themodel, the government’s
manipulation incentive would actually be augmented and the
countercyclicality result would be even stronger.
believe that this has absolutely no effect on the
deficit. If either condition is violated, the coun-
tercyclicality result holds.
V. DATA, INSTITUTIONAL SETTING, AND
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The implications of the theoretical model
are tested using financial, economic, and polit-
ical data for all 308 Portuguese municipalities.
Local finance data were obtained from the Por-
tuguese Directorate General of Local Authorities
(DGAL), information regarding local elections
and mayors from the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
and demographic and economic data from the
National Statistics Institute (INE). Actual GDP
data and GDP forecasts are not available at the
municipal level (NUTS IV level); so we go to the
second lowest level of disaggregation, the NUTS
III level, whenever possible.14
Actual GDP data are available at the NUTS III
level from 1991 to 2014. Given that there are no
GDP growth rate forecasts at neither the munic-
ipal nor the regional levels, we use the 1-year-
ahead forecasts from the national government’s
budget, which is approved by the Portuguese par-
liament in October, shortly before the municipal-
ities must also approve their budgets for the fol-
lowing year. Since the formula-determined trans-
fers that municipalities receive from the central
government are indicated in the national budget,
the latter must be taken into account when elab-
orating the municipal budgets. Then, the gov-
ernment’s forecast of national real GDP growth,
and information on their regions’ current and past
growth rates, can be used by mayors to form their
expectations of next year’s GDP growth rates in
their regions.15
A. Regional GDP Growth Forecasts
Short-run forecasts are commonly gener-
ated using ARIMA and ARIMAX models (see
Enders 2004). The former is a univariate time
series model which uses autoregressive (AR)
and moving average (MA) components of the
dependent variable to explain or forecast its
behavior. The latter uses those AR and MA
14. NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for terri-
torial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into three NUTS
I regions (Mainland, Azores, and Madeira), seven NUTS II
regions, and 25 NUTS III regions. Each NUTS III region
aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the
NUTS IV level.
15. In robustness tests, we also use 1-year-ahead GDP
growth forecasts from the IMF’s WEO, and unemployment
rate forecasts from both the national budget and the WEO.
2066 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
components jointly with a vector X of other
explanatory variables. When the dependent vari-
able is not stationary (i.e., it is integrated), it is
necessary to take differences of it in the order
of integration. The most appropriate model for
the data at hand can then be selected using the
strategy suggested by Box and Jenkins (1976).
In order to obtain 1-year-ahead regional
forecasts, we estimate ARIMAX(2,0,1), that
is, ARMAX(2,1),16 models for the NUTS III
GDP growth rates, employing the government’s
national GDP growth forecast as an explana-
tory variable. These estimated regional GDP
growth forecasts can be used as a proxy for the
mayors’ growth expectations in their regions, as
they incorporate national GDP forecasts, while
accounting for regional economic conditions.
The ARMAX(2,1) model for each region can be
summarized as follows:
RegGDPt(18)
= α0 + α1RegGDPt−1 + α2RegGDPt−2
+ α3ForecNatGDPt + ζt + α4ζt−1,
where RegGDPt is the real GDP growth rate for
the region under scrutiny in year t, ForecNatGDPt
is the national real GDP growth forecast for year t
(obtained from the national budget for year t), and
ζt is a white noise error term. The predicted val-
ues from the estimation of Equation (20) for each
of the 25 NUTS III regions are used in our empir-
ical analysis as the regional growth forecasts.17
B. Institutional Setting
Local election dates are fixed exogenously
from the perspective of the municipalities and
16. Since regional growth rates were found to be station-
ary, there is no need to take first-differences of the series.
The ARMAX(2,1) specification was the one found to be most
appropriate for the majority of NUTS III regions.
17. Regarding the accuracy of these forecasts, the mean
error (ME) is −0.13, the mean absolute error (MAE) is 2.26,
and the root mean squared error (RMSE) is 3.19. The figures
for the national forecasts from the government’s budget are:
ME = 0.44;MAE = 1.06; RMSE = 1.38. The smallerME for
regional forecasts indicates that positive and negative errors
tend to compensate each other, leading to a smaller aver-
age bias. But, since the errors are larger (in absolute value)
for regional forecasts, these have higher MAE and RMSE.
Larger errors in regional forecasts are expected, since regional
growth rates exhibit larger volatility than national growth
rates (the standard deviations are, respectively, 2.28 and 4.38).
Regarding the correlation between actual and forecasted val-
ues, it is 0.69 for regions and 0.83 at the national level. Over-
all, although national forecasts tend to be more accurate, the
accuracy of the regional forecasts generated by the ARMAX
models appear quite reasonable.
they take place in all of them at the same time.
The first municipal elections following the blood-
less military coup of April 25, 1974 were held in
December 1976. Since then, there were elections
every 3 years until 1985, and every 4 years there-
after (in December until 2001, and in October
since then). Other elections were never held at the
same time; although local elections sometimes
occurred in the same year as national elections,
they were always at least three months apart.
Municipalities are governed by the Town
Council (Câmara Municipal), which holds the
executive power, and by the Municipal Assem-
bly, which holds the deliberative power and
approves the municipal budgets and plans of
activities. The members of both chambers are
elected directly by citizens, who vote on closed
party or independent lists of candidates. The
top candidate of the list receiving most votes
for the Town Council becomes the mayor, pre-
sides over that chamber, and plays a leading
role in the executive, having substantial power
and autonomy.
The municipal budget is drafted by the
mayor’s team, analyzed by the Town Council,
and finally approved by the Municipal Assembly,
in the last quarter of the year prior to the relevant
fiscal year (which corresponds to the calendar
year). A mayor will have more room of maneu-
ver regarding the budget when her party holds a
majority of deputies in both the Town Council
and the Municipal Assembly. As shown in the
descriptive statistics (Table E1 in Appendix E),
this happens in 75% of the cases, implying that
the approval of the municipal budget is gener-
ally easy. Thus, in practice, the mayor plays a
decisive role in local fiscal policy.
All Portuguese municipalities are subject to
the same laws and regulations, and have the
same responsibilities. Regarding public service
provision, they are responsible for sewage,
the distribution of water, local transportation
and communication, basic schooling, property
maintenance, promotion of culture and science,
recreation and sports facilities, local health care,
social housing, environmental protection, and
municipal policing. Municipalities are finan-
cially autonomous in the sense of being able to
elaborate and approve their own budgets without
needing approval from a higher-ranked authority.
But, for the large majority of municipalities,
most revenues come from grants from the central
government or from the European Union. In
fact, own revenues account, on average, for just
one third of total effective revenues (excluding
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loans), while formula-related (unconditional)
grants from the central government account for
roughly 40%, and other transfers from the central
government or from the European Union account
for the remaining 27%.
Municipalities are allowed to run budget
deficits, but the law which regulates municipal
finances imposes limits to deficits and to the
stock of gross debt. A municipality whose debt
is above the legal limit is obliged to reduce
the excess debt by 10% each year. Excessive
debt accumulation is typically not a problem for
municipalities; currently only 20 out of the 308
have to submit to a formal debt reduction regime.
C. Empirical Model
According to our theoretical model presented
above (Proposition 1), expected recessions in
election years create incentives to generate
higher budget deficits. That is, in an election
year, mayors will be unwilling to counter the
negative effects of a recession on the bud-
get balance by sufficiently raising revenues
(through higher local taxes and fees) or cutting
expenditures (lowering the level of local public
goods provision), which results in higher budget
deficits. This does not necessarily happen in
off-election years, when mayors can behave in
a more responsible (less opportunistic) manner.
These implications are tested with the following
empirical model:
Di,t = β1ElYi,t + β2Exp.Recessi,t(19)
+ β3 (ElY ∗ Exp.Recess)i,t
+ X′i,tω + νi + σt + ξi,t,
where Di, t is the primary budget deficit
18 of
municipality i in year t in real euros (of 2015) per
capita; ElYi, t is a dummy variable that equals one
in municipal election years, and zero otherwise;
Exp.Recessi, t is our expected recession variable,
based on the forecast of GDP growth for year
t in the region to which municipality i belongs;
Xi, t is a vector of control variables which may
affect budget balances; νi represents unobserved
municipality-specific effects; σt represents time-
specific effects; and ξi, t is the error term.19
18. We use the primary deficit (i.e., excluding interest
payments) since it is the budget deficit that mayors can
best influence in practice. Nevertheless, as shown in several
robustness tests reported in Appendix E, we obtain very
similar results when using the fiscal deficit, that is, including
interest payments.
19. Since the election-year dummy would be collinear
with yearly dummy variables, we control for time effects
Our expected recession variable,
Exp.Recessi, t, based on the estimated fore-
casts of the regional real GDP growth rate
obtained in the ARMAX models of Equation
(20), is defined in four alternative ways: (1)
the forecast itself, with negative values corre-
sponding to expected recessions; (2) an expected
recession dummy variable, which takes the
value of one when a negative growth rate is
forecasted, and equals zero otherwise; (3) two
dummy variables for expected unusually low
growth, which equal one when the forecasted
rate of real GDP growth is below the 25th or
33rd percentiles, respectively, of the past values
of regional real GDP growth. Exp.Recessi, t is
interacted with ElYi, t, so that we can check if the
effects of expected recessions in election years
are different from those in the other years of the
electoral cycle.
Given the theoretical model and the evidence
of PBCs in Portuguese municipalities shown in
previous studies (e.g., Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga
2011; Veiga and Veiga 2007), we expect a pos-
itive β1, consistent with higher budget deficits
in election years. Furthermore—and this is
the focus of our study—an expected recession
for an election year leads to a higher deficit
according to Proposition 1 of our theoretical
model. Therefore, a negative β3 is expected
when our expected recession variable is the
forecasted growth rate (expected lower growth
rates lead to higher deficits), and a positive β3 is
expected when Exp.Recessi, t corresponds to the
dummies for negative growth or for unusually
low growth rates (expected recessions lead to
higher deficits). The overall election-year effect
on the budget balance is given by (β1 +β3 *
Exp.Recessi, t).
The vector Xi, t includes a set of control vari-
ables which may affect budget balances. These
are related to demographics (dependency ratio
and population density),20 the ideological ori-
entation and the experience (years in office) of
the mayor, and whether or not the mayor’s party
holds a majority in both the Town Council and
the Municipal Assembly. Descriptive statistics of
the variables used in this paper are presented in
Appendix E (Table E1).
using 5-year period dummies. In robustness tests, we also use
4-year mandate dummies and a cubic time trend.
20. The dependency ratio is the percentage of the
population below 15 or above 65 years old. Population
and population growth were never statistically signifi-
cant when included, and sometimes caused problems of
collinearity.
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TABLE 3
Countercyclicality in PBCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Variable
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Dummy
Forecast <25th
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Forecast <33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Election year 48.312∗∗∗ 20.225∗∗∗ 23.432∗∗∗ 17.750∗∗∗
(10.134) (3.864) (4.845) (3.537)
Expected recession 4.631∗∗∗ −21.288∗∗∗ −26.993∗∗∗ −19.412∗∗∗
(5.258) (−3.452) (−3.695) (−3.574)
Election year * expected recession −8.519∗∗∗ 50.749∗∗∗ 56.571∗∗∗ 50.676∗∗∗
(−5.178) (5.495) (5.420) (5.640)
Dependency ratio −1.078 −0.997 −1.301 −1.109
(−0.753) (−0.700) (−0.911) (−0.756)
Population density 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(4.018) (3.900) (4.262) (3.909)
Mayor left −18.710∗∗∗ −18.557∗∗∗ −18.606∗∗∗ −18.663∗∗∗
(−3.080) (−3.066) (−3.022) (−3.081)
Mayor independent 24.605 23.787 24.589 25.093
(0.986) (0.950) (0.982) (1.002)
Years mayor −0.131 −0.188 −0.116 −0.184
(−0.351) (−0.504) (−0.306) (−0.496)
Majority 1.989 2.299 2.399 2.275
(0.380) (0.437) (0.458) (0.434)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .087 .086 .086 .086
Number of municipalities 308 308 308 308
Marginal effects of expected recession
At election year= 1 −3.888∗∗ 29.461∗∗∗ 29.578∗∗∗ 31.264∗∗∗
(−2.57) (3.47) (3.35) (3.93)
Notes: Expected recession variable defined as indicated in the respective column title. Municipal effects controlled for with
municipal dummies and time effects with 5-year dummies. T-statistics based on bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000
replications) are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The baseline empirical model of Equation
(21) is estimated for a panel of 308 Portuguese
municipalities, with data from 1992 to 2014,
controlling for municipal fixed effects, and using
bootstrap-corrected standard errors based on
1,000 replications.21 The results are reported in
Table 3. In the title of each column, we indicate
the definition of the Exp.Recessi, t variable used.
21. Bootstrapping is used to obtain corrected standard
errors, as the use of regional growth forecasts generated from
Equation (20) can lead to Generated Regressors problems,
biasing the standard errors of ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimations. As shown in the robustness results of Table E2,
the results of OLS estimations with robust standard errors
clustered by NUTS III region and year, or by municipality,
are practically the same, as standard errors are quite similar to
those obtainedwith the bootstrap procedure. The same applies
to clustering by region and by 4-year mandate dummies
(results not shown). Clustering bymunicipality and year is not
appropriate because only one observation per cluster would be
available.
The marginal effects of the expected recession
variable in election years are reported at the foot
of the table.22
The election year dummy variable is always
statistically significant with a positive sign, indi-
cating that there is a tendency for higher pri-
mary deficits in election years which can be spec-
ified in terms of real euros per capita (base year
2015). Concretely, the primary deficit increases
by between 17.8 and 48.3 euros per capita in elec-
tion years relative to off-election years. These
results confirm those of Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga
(2011) and Veiga and Veiga (2007) regarding the
existence of PBCs in Portuguese municipalities.
The interaction of the forecast variable with
the election year dummy is also always statisti-
cally significant. As expected, and in accordance
22. The marginal effects in off-election years are given
by the estimated coefficient of Exp.Recess. It is worth noting
that the overall marginal effect of Exp.Recess (not shown) is
always statistically significant.
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with Proposition 1 of our theoretical model, an
expected recession leads to an even higher pri-
mary deficit in an election year. Local govern-
ments will not want to bear the electoral costs of
reducing the provision of local public goods in
order to compensate for the lower tax revenues.
The marginal effect for an election year reported
at the foot of column 1 indicates that a 1 standard
deviation (see Table E1) reduction in the fore-
casted growth rate increases the primary deficit
by 10.8 (=− 2.78*[−3.888]) euros per capita,23
and the results of column 2 indicate that the effect
of an expected recession in an election year is
29.5 (=50.749–21.288) euros per capita, again a
positive effect. This is the countercyclical policy
effect predicted in Proposition 1.
Conversely, the effect of an expected reces-
sion in an off-election year is procyclical. The
significant coefficients for expected recessions in
columns 2–4 are negative, in column 1 positive,
indicating that primary deficits are reduced in
nonelection years when the economy is expected
to slow down. This could be interpreted as pre-
cautionary fiscal policy. The flip side of this is that
an expected expansion creates desires for needs
and voraciousness. In column 1, a 1 standard
deviation reduction in the forecasted growth rate
decreases the primary deficit by 12.9 euros per
capita (=− 2.78*4.631), and according to col-
umn 2, the primary deficit is reduced by 21.3
euros per capita when a recession is forecasted
for an off-election year. These negative effects
are opposite to the automatic countercyclical
response onewould expect of an actual recession.
Regarding the control variables, greater pop-
ulation density seems to lead to higher primary
deficits, eventually due to costs of congestion.
The results also indicate that left-wing mayors
produce lower deficits than their right-wing coun-
terparts.24 The other control variables do not
23. Note that the expectation of a boom would cause a
reduction in the primary deficit. For example, a 1 standard
deviation increase in the forecasted growth rate in an election
year would lead to a reduction of the primary deficit by 10.8
euros per capita.
24. Veiga and Veiga (2007) obtain a similar result.
Although the purpose of the present paper is not to explain
partisan differences in deficits, we checked whether smaller
deficits by left-wing mayors could be caused by greater trans-
fers from the central government (because there was a preva-
lence of left-wing national governments during the sample
period). This does not seem to have happened, as average
transfers for left- and right-wing municipalities were very
similar, with a slightly higher amount given to the latter. This
applies to both election and off-election years. Party simi-
larity between the mayor and the prime minister does not
seem to have mattered either. It is possible that the ideological
seem to significantly affect primary budget bal-
ances.25
A. Robustness Checks
Overall, the results of Table 3 provide evi-
dence for the implications of our theoretical
model, as the interaction of the election year
dummy with the expected recession variable is
always statistically significant with the expected
sign. The robustness of these empirical results is
first checked by implementing several specifica-
tion changes: excluding the control variables of
vector Xi, t; controlling for time-specific effects
in two alternative ways—with mandate dum-
mies (one for each 4-year term), and with a cubic
time trend; and by using robust standard errors
clustered in two alternative ways—by NUTS III
region and year, and by municipality—instead
of bootstrapping. As shown in Appendix E
(Table E2) the results regarding the election
year dummy variable and its interaction with the
expected recession variable remain qualitatively
and robustly the same.26
A second set of robustness checks eval-
uates the sensitivity of the results to several
sample restrictions: excluding the 30 munici-
palities of the islands of Azores and Madeira,
in order to work with a more homogeneous
data set of 278 mainland municipalities; exclud-
ing the 100 municipalities for which average
formula-determined grants are above 50% of
distance between the mayor’s party and the opposition affects
fiscal policy outcomes, but we cannot check that possibility
since there is no ideology index placing mayors or their par-
ties on a left-right scale. But, given that most mayors (75%)
are supported by a majority of deputies in both the Munici-
pal Council and the Municipal Assembly, and do not need to
negotiate with the opposition, ideological differences may not
be very relevant in Portuguese municipalities anyway.
25. We also tested for the effects of majority and years
in office on the degree of opportunistic deficit manipulation.
That is, we checked if the effects are lower when the mayor’s
party does not hold a majority, due to greater difficulty to
approve the budget, or for mayors who have been longer in
office, as voters learn about their skills. We found no robust
evidence of heterogeneous effects in any of these cases. The
inclusion of a dummy for coalition governments, or of a
variable indicating the number of parties in the government
coalition, does not affect the results, and these variables are
not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that
coalition governments are quite rare (only 3.67%). Finally,
defining the election variable using Franzese Jr.’s (2002)
approach leads to very similar results. These results, and all
others that are not shown in the paper, are available upon
request.
26. Including the lagged primary deficit as an explanatory
variable leads to very similar results. The lagged primary
deficit is not statistically significant when included and Wald
tests allow for its exclusion from the model.
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average revenues, so that only more financially
autonomous municipalities are considered;
restricting the sample period to mandates
during which no mayors were term-limited
(1992–2009)27; and, excluding all term-limited
mayors, keeping only reelection eligible mayors
during the entire sample period (1992–2014).28
As reported in Appendix E (Table E3), the results
are again consistent with the existence of PBCs
and with our theoretical model’s conclusion
that an expected recession leads to even higher
election-year primary deficits.
The third set of robustness tests (see Table E4
in Appendix E) starts by checking if differences
between forecasted and actual regional growth
rates affect the primary deficit. The results indi-
cate that they do not. Then we check if results
differ when the fiscal deficit is used as dependent
variable, instead of the primary deficit. Again, the
results remain essentially the same. Finally, we
generate regional growth forecasts using World
Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) national fore-
casts, instead of those of the Portuguese govern-
ment. As shown in the last two panels of Table E4,
the results obtained for the primary deficit and for
the fiscal deficit are very similar to those reported
in Table 3.
B. Controlling for Time Effects with Year
Dummies
Although the results shown in Table 3 are
quite robust and present clear evidence support-
ing our theoretical model, the fact that elections
occur in all municipalities at the same time poses
a problem to the estimation of the election-year
effect. That is, the election-year dummy vari-
able may also capture the effects on primary
deficits of other events common to all municipal-
ities, which happened in election years. Effects
common to all municipalities could be captured
by annual dummy variables, but their inclusion
in the baseline model of Equation (21) was
27. Until the 2009 elections, all mayors could run for
reelection, regardless of how long they had been in office.
The limit of three consecutive terms as mayor of a specific
municipality became binding in the 2013 elections, in which
160 mayors could not run for reelection. Of the mayors
elected in 2013, 41 cannot run for reelection in 2017. Since not
being able to stand for reelection may alter the incentives of
mayors, it would have been possible that our baseline results
were affected by the presence of lame ducks.
28. Lax and Phillips (2012) argue that term limits
enhance responsiveness whichwould imply less opportunism.
The electoral impact of term limits discussed by Gilmour and
Rothstein (1994) is, however, not scrutinized in the empirical
part of our paper.
unfeasible because they would be collinear with
the election-year dummy variable. For that rea-
son, we controlled for time effects using 5-year
period dummies.
However, it is possible that period dummies
(or time trends) do not solve the aforemen-
tioned problem. Thus, in the estimations whose
results are reported in Table 4 we control for
time effects using year dummies. As in Table 3,
the interaction of the election-year dummy with
the expected recession variable is always sta-
tistically significant, with the correct sign. The
simple expected recession effect is only signif-
icant for the growth forecast specification, but
that does not matter. The overall effect of an
expected recession in an election year is, again,
very strong, thus providing further evidence in
favor of our hypothesis that election-year reces-
sion expectations lead to higher budget deficits,
that is, the predicted countercyclical policy effect.
Regarding the year dummies, those correspond-
ing to election years (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005,
2009, and 2013) are generally statistically signif-
icant, with the expected positive sign, and with
higher estimated coefficients than those of the
previous years of the same electoral cycle.29
In order to make the results more compara-
ble to those of Table 3, we compute the aver-
ages of the estimated coefficients for election and
nonelection years, and test the significance of
the difference between those averages. As shown
at the bottom of Table 4, that difference (Elec-
tion year − Non-election year) is always statis-
tically significant, with a positive sign, and with
a magnitude that is similar to that of the esti-
mated coefficients for the election-year dummy
in Table 3. Therefore, these results provide fur-
ther support for the implications of our theoreti-
cal model.
As a robustness check to these results, we
interacted the expected recession variable with
dummies for each election year, instead of with
a single dummy variable for all election years.
The results shown in Appendix E (Table E5)
are consistent with our theoretical model, as
for all election years except 2001, the interac-
tion of the expected recession variable with the
29. The exceptions are 1993, which is only statistically
significant in column 1, and 2013, which is only marginally
significant, with a negative sign, in column 3. It is, however,
worth noting that 2011 and 2012 have larger negative coeffi-
cients than 2013, indicating that the primary deficit increased
(or the primary surplus decreased) in 2013 relative to the pre-
vious 2 years, which is consistent with the presence of PBCs
and opportunistic behavior of mayors. In the same vein, 1993
has a smaller negative coefficient than the following years.
BOHN & VEIGA: POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND RECESSIONS 2071
TABLE 4
Countercyclicality in PBCs (Using Year Dummies)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Growth
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Forecast <25th
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Forecast <33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Expected recession 3.461∗∗∗ −8.791 −12.424 −4.880
(3.059) (−1.243) (−1.459) (−0.783)
Election year * expected recession −4.813∗∗ 27.370∗∗ 35.259∗∗∗ 25.127∗∗
(−2.306) (2.145) (2.611) (2.266)
1993 (election year) 20.590∗∗∗ −5.808 −6.616 −7.513
(2.673) (−0.507) (−0.676) (−0.721)
1994 −2.177 −9.051 −10.071 −9.306
(−0.302) (−1.288) (−1.453) (−1.329)
1995 −22.468∗∗∗ −25.572∗∗∗ −25.539∗∗∗ −26.223∗∗∗
(−3.186) (−3.622) (−3.654) (−3.736)
1996 −13.304∗ −12.416∗ −12.602∗ −12.666∗
(−1.874) (−1.744) (−1.774) (−1.778)
1997 (election year) 45.264∗∗∗ 28.156∗∗∗ 27.797∗∗∗ 27.160∗∗∗
(4.556) (3.477) (3.431) (3.350)
1998 32.239∗∗∗ 35.050∗∗∗ 35.152∗∗∗ 34.687∗∗∗
(3.982) (4.289) (4.316) (4.242)
1999 6.328 8.646 8.483 8.517
(0.867) (1.180) (1.162) (1.158)
2000 44.309∗∗∗ 44.186∗∗∗ 44.495∗∗∗ 43.728∗∗∗
(4.585) (4.582) (4.619) (4.522)
2001 (election year) 70.215∗∗∗ 51.409∗∗∗ 52.350∗∗∗ 51.190∗∗∗
(6.490) (5.055) (5.202) (5.019)
2002 49.713∗∗∗ 44.859∗∗∗ 43.193∗∗∗ 43.947∗∗∗
(5.489) (5.023) (4.886) (4.909)
2003 22.217∗∗∗ 16.410∗ 16.469∗ 16.219∗
(2.598) (1.942) (1.951) (1.917)
2004 1.233 −6.660 −7.414 −6.450
(0.153) (−0.863) (−0.961) (−0.825)
2005 (election year) 44.495∗∗∗ 28.195∗∗∗ 28.061∗∗∗ 26.348∗∗∗
(4.159) (3.256) (3.237) (3.054)
2006 −0.013 −8.777 −9.531 −8.527
(−0.002) (−1.084) (−1.197) (−1.016)
2007 −21.802∗∗ −28.056∗∗∗ −28.367∗∗∗ −29.077∗∗∗
(−2.389) (−3.135) (−3.188) (−3.236)
2008 20.530∗∗ 14.477 13.554 13.871
(1.964) (1.422) (1.329) (1.358)
2009 (election year) 79.186∗∗∗ 56.223∗∗∗ 57.815∗∗∗ 53.490∗∗∗
(6.026) (3.989) (4.435) (4.124)
2010 16.685 8.837 6.053 8.052
(0.942) (0.493) (0.349) (0.481)
2011 −27.158∗∗ −35.001∗∗∗ −35.052∗∗∗ −38.115∗∗∗
(−2.491) (−3.041) (−3.289) (−3.220)
2012 −50.880∗∗∗ −71.902∗∗∗ −68.228∗∗∗ −75.798∗∗∗
(−3.816) (−6.512) (−5.831) (−7.227)
2013 (election year) 2.619 −22.304 −22.014 −24.357∗
(0.200) (−1.476) (−1.513) (−1.699)
2014 −66.895∗∗∗ −74.645∗∗∗ −75.763∗∗∗ −75.693∗∗∗
(−4.911) (−5.328) (−5.714) (−5.429)
Election year - Off-election year 44.443∗∗∗ 28.871∗∗∗ 29.472∗∗∗ 28.105∗∗∗
(9.843) (4.482) (5.325) (4.808)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .100 .100 .100 .100
Number of municipalities 308 308 308 308
Notes: Expected recession variable defined as indicated in the respective column title. The control variables of Table 3 are
included. T-statistics based on bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5
Using Forecasts for Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Unemployment
Rate Forecast
Forecast >66th
Percentile of Past
Unemployment Rates
Forecast >50th
Percentile of Past
Unemployment Rates
Municipal forecasts based on the government’s forecasts of national unemployment rates
Election year 2.299 40.175∗∗∗ 33.973∗∗∗
(0.141) (6.305) (4.674)
Expected recession −6.244∗∗∗ −19.405∗∗ −19.339∗∗∗
(−3.459) (−2.493) (−2.943)
Election year * expected recession 6.863∗∗∗ 21.877∗ 26.792∗∗
(2.893) (1.850) (2.520)
Observations 5,205 5,205 5,205
R2 .098 .095 .096
Municipal forecasts based on IMF’s forecasts of national unemployment rates
Election year 3.051 40.768∗∗∗ 34.475∗∗∗
(0.178) (5.940) (4.402)
Expected recession −6.494∗∗∗ −18.245∗∗ −19.498∗∗∗
(−3.516) (−2.321) (−2.962)
Election year * expected recession 6.855∗∗∗ 22.202∗ 27.085∗∗
(2.793) (1.828) (2.431)
Observations 5,222 5,222 5,222
R2 .097 .095 .096
Notes: The baseline model of Table 3 was used in all estimations. It includes a vector of control variables, municipal fixed-
effects, 5-year period dummies. Recession variable defined as indicated in the respective column title. T-statistics based on
bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
election year dummy is statistically significant,
with the correct sign.30 The p values of Wald
tests presented in the last row indicate that we
can always reject the hypothesis that the interac-
tions are jointly equal to zero. We interpret this
as further corroborating evidence for the theoreti-
cal prediction that recessions expected in election
years lead to increases in primary deficits.
C. Using Forecasts for the Municipal
Unemployment Rate
The use of regional GDP growth forecasts is
due to the fact that GDP data is not available
at the municipal level. But, when using regional
forecasts to represent mayors’ expectations of
municipal economic performance, we implicitly
assume that the municipalities of each NUTS III
region are somewhat homogeneous. Although a
region’s economic growth obviously impacts on
the performance of its municipalities, the latter do
30. The interactions for 2005 could not be estimated in
columns 2 and 3 because, in 2005, there were no regions
for which the expected recession dummy or the dummy for
forecasts below the 25th percentile of past growth rates were
equal to one.
not necessarily react in the same way. Therefore,
it is desirable to check if our results are robust to
the use of an economic variable correlated with
GDP for which municipal level data is available.
One such variable is the unemployment rate, for
which there is municipal data since 1997.
ARMAX models, such as those of Equation
(20), were estimated for each of the 308 munic-
ipalities to generate 1-year ahead forecasts of
municipal unemployment rates. Two sets of fore-
casts were produced, one using the government’s
forecasts31 of the national unemployment rate as
an explanatory variable, and the other using the
WEO-IMF forecasts. Table 5 shows the results
obtained when the expected recession variable
is based on municipal unemployment rates. The
results are slightly weaker than those obtained for
GDP forecasts and the election year dummy is
not statistically significant in column 1. Nonethe-
less, the expected recession variable and its inter-
action with the election year dummy are always
31. When the budget elaborated by the national govern-
ment does not include a forecast for the unemployment rate,
the WEO-IMF forecast is used instead.
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significant, with the expected signs.32 Concretely,
expected higher unemployment rates or values
above the 50th or the 66th percentiles in election
years lead to higher primary deficits compared to
election years with lower expectations for unem-
ployment.33
Overall, the results obtained when using fore-
casts for municipal unemployment rates cor-
roborate those of the previous tables, in which
regional GDP growth forecasts were used, and
provide further support for the implications of our
theoretical model.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the impact of expected
recessions on the PBC. As shown in the theo-
retical model, budget manipulations allow the
incumbent to increase her reelection chances,
even in a recession. This is, however, only
possible if electoral manipulations in reces-
sionary times go beyond the manipulations an
incumbent employs in ordinary election years
(with no recession). The latter result is pre-
dicted in the theoretical part and supported by a
plethora of evidence presented in the empirical
part.
Two innovations have been made to the
PBC literature in order to be able to obtain the
aforementioned theoretical results. First, based
on conventional wisdom and on the empirical
specifics in Portugal we argued that consumer-
voters should exhibit belief inertia, that is, lag
behind to some degree with their willingness
or ability to update their expectations. This
assumption alone suffices to produce a theoreti-
cal prediction for what has long been established
empirically, but could not be explained satis-
factorily by rational expectations models (see
also Footnote 4). Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
(2004), Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2011), and
Klomp and de Haan (2013) present empirical
evidence that government manipulations are
actually successful in increasing the incumbent’s
reelection chances.
Second, voters and politicians can respond to
changes in the economic environment because
32. Part of the difference in results may be due to the
smaller sample for unemployment rates; the number of obser-
vations drops by around 1,800, as the sample period starts 6
years later and the crisis years get a relatively larger weight in
the overall sample.
33. Essentially the same results are obtained for the fiscal
deficit or when clustering standard errors in different ways
(not shown, but, again, available upon request).
economic growth is included in our theoreti-
cal model. If voters lag behind politicians in
the perception of a growth decline, they judge
the implied reduction in the provision of pub-
lic goods more harshly, that is, attribute a lower
level of competence to the incumbent, which
reduces her reelection chances. An optimizing
opportunistic government will increase its deficit
so that it can raise the provision of public goods,
thereby trading off higher deficit repayment costs
for an increased chance of receiving next period’s
ego rent. The increased manipulation works, if
voters do not fully adjust their expectations of
the increase in the budget deficit caused by the
government’s response to the recession; a lower
perception of the deficit amounts to a hidden
effort by the government which voters attribute to
the incumbent’s competence and hence increases
reelection chances. This is the main prediction of
the theoretical part: recessions in election years
amplify the PBC.
The empirical results obtained for a sam-
ple comprising all 308 Portuguese municipali-
ties, from 1992 to 2014, provide ample evidence
for the core finding of the theoretical model;
fiscal manipulations increase in expected reces-
sions. This amounts to countercyclical policy,
all for the wrong reason of opportunistic behav-
ior rather than Keynesian stabilization policy. In
particular, we find strong evidence that budget
deficits go up in election years far beyond normal
manipulations when a recession or unusually low
growth is expected. We use an array of regression
specifications. Among many others, we also con-
trol for time effects with year dummies and use
forecasts for the municipal unemployment rate.
This work could be extended in three direc-
tions. First, our prediction should be tested with
other data sets, both for regional/municipal data
and country data. Second, our prediction could
also be tested in totally different settings, for
instance in an optimizing New Keynesian model
as suggested by Milani (2010). Third, we have
not checked, if the countercyclical effects work
for boom periods to the same degree. Consider-
ing the interaction of the forecast variable with
the election year dummy for Column (1) (which
refers to the growth forecasts) in all tables, it
seems that the effect goes in the opposite direc-
tion for expected booms. However, we are not
certain that the results remain equally robust, if
above average boom periods are scrutinized. It is
not certain that incumbents would, analogously,
like to reduce their deficits while accepting a
less increased reelection chance. It is also not
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certain that belief inertia is equally strong in both
directions. Hence, there is a lot more work to be
done on the effect of economic fluctuations on
the PBC.
APPENDIX A
The Appendix presents indications for the model solu-
tion in Section III and for the derivation of the propositions
in Section IV. It also presents additional analytical results,
descriptive statistics, and additional empirical results.
First, we consider an individual who votes prospectively,
that is, she would prefer the politician who can deliver the
highest level of expected overall utility in (t+ 1). It consists
of utility from consumption, utility from the provision of local
public goods, and utility from the ideological alignment with
the politician. She votes for incumbent a, if
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)
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(
− 1
2
)]
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.(A1)
Obviously, voters differ in their preference for party a
and b. Expected consumption is identical for both politi-
cians, whereas the expected provision of local public goods
is affected by the policymakers’ competence and individuals’
expectations thereof:
(A2) Eit
[
u
(
cat+1
)]
= Eit
[
u
(
cbt+1
)]
= Eit
[
u
(
(1 − τ) ϵt+1
)]
;
(A3)
Eit
[
Ljt+1
]
= Eit
[
τεt+1 −
(
1 + rt
)
Dt + η
j
t+1
]
, j = a, b.
Equation (A3) says that voters base their expectation of
the provision of public goods in period (t+ 1) on their belief
of tax revenue in (t+ 1). The period t deficit is repaid in period
(t+ 1) because it is costly. The policymaker will try not to
borrow in period (t+ 1) because there is no election at the end
of that period and a nonbalanced budget carries a repayment
cost. Individuals have no idea about the skills shock of either
potential policymaker in t+ 1. Nor do they know the skills
shock of the challenger in period t, and, therefore, expect 0.
However, they can use the incumbent’s period t fiscal policy
to draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t. The
expected level of local public goods of the challenger differs
from what is know of the incumbent:
(A4) Et
[
Lbt+1
]
= Et
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1 + rt
)
Dt
]
;
(A5) Et
[
Lat+1
]
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[
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(
1 + rt
)
Dt
]
+ Et
[
μat
]
.
Combining Equations (A1)–(A5) we can obtain a condi-
tion for an individual to vote for incumbent a (which corre-
sponds to condition (6) in the main text):
(A6) Et
[
μat
]
> αθi.
Using the distribution of the skills shockwe can determine
the probability (Pr) of any voter to vote for incumbent a:
(A7)
Pr
[
Et
[
μat
]
− αθi ≥ 0
]
=
Et
[
μat
]
− (−α)
α − (−α)
=
Et
[
μat
]
2α
+ 1
2
.
FIGURE B1
Bell-Shaped Competence Density Function as an Example
APPENDIX B
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incum-
bent a obtains 50% of the votes in the period t elections. It is
the probability that mass 1 of voters, that is, all voters, times
their individual probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as
determined in Equation (A7)) is greater or equal to 1
2
. The
probability for the incumbent to win the election—Equation
(7) in the main text—is repeated here:
(B1) Prob
{ [
Et
[
μat
]
2α
+ 1
2
]
≥
1
2
}
.
Competence extraction mechanism. Voters’ expectation
of government competence μat can be obtained by studying
the voters’ perception of the government budget constraint
(4) from the main text which is repeated here (with Equation
(5) inserted):
(B2) Lt = τεt + Dt −
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 + μat + μ
a
t−1.
The true competence is:
(B3) μat = Lt − τεt − Dt +
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 − μat−1.
Voters can observe the level of local public goods Lt , pre-
vious period deficit Dt− 1, previous period competence μat−1,
interest rate rt− 1 and the tax rate τ. Their perception of gov-
ernment competence is, however, also affected by their expec-
tation of growth and the government deficit policy (which can
be concealed, for instance, by using special government funds
and accounting tricks). Hence we obtain what corresponds to
Equation (9) in the main text:
Et
[
μat
]
= μ̂at = Lt − τε̂t − D̂t +
(
1 + rt−1
)
Dt−1 − μat−1
= Lt − τεt − Dt +
(
1 + rt−1
)
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(B4)
Hence the incumbent’s probability of winning becomes
(Equations (10)–(12) in the main text):
Probwin
= Prob
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
μat +
[
τ
(
εt − ε̂t
)]
+
[
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]
2α
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2
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1
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= Prob
{
μat ≥
[
τ
(
ε̂t − εt
)]
+
[
D̂t − Dt
]}(B5)
(B6) = 1 − F
[
τ
(
ε̂t − εt
)
+ D̂t − Dt
]
,
where F(•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
The marked area toward the right (light grey or yellow
[if in colour]) under the density function depicted in Figure
B1 corresponds to the probability described by Equation (B5)
and by the distribution function representation in Equation
(B6). Expected competence overall is greater than actual
competence, if, in case of a recession, the government’s deficit
makes up for the voters’ underestimation of the shortfall in
tax revenue (τ
(
ε̂t − εt
)
< 0), plus the voters’ expected deficit
D̂t (deficit bias). Then the probability (see Equation (B6) or
the light grey [or yellow] area under the density function)
is always greater than 1
2
and the government’s chance to be
reelected is increased. The competence perception of voters
would also be increased if voters fully knew of and believed
in the forecasted recession or did not have a deficit bias.
Inert-rational voters are described in Equations (13) and
(14) in the main text which are reproduced here:
(B7)
Eit
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= ε̂t = φε + (1 − φ) εt , 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, for all i.
(B8) Eit
[
Dt
]
= D̂t = D + γτ
(
ε − ε̂t
)
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, for all i.
On this basis, we can derive Equation (15) in the main
text:
Probwin = 1 − F
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,
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,
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]
.(B9)
APPENDIX C
Prior to elections, incumbent a would like to maximize
her utility over periods t and (t+ 1) by choosing Dt (see the
timing of events on page 14). Period (t+ 1) utility is the sum
of the utilities for winning and losing the election weighted
by the probability determined previously. Hence, incumbent
a’s decision problem:
max
Dt
Vat = maxDt
V = max
Dt
Wat +W
a
t+1
= max
Dt
Eat
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(
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)
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}
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+ Lt+1 + Probwin X,(C2)
where
Lt = τεt + Dt −
(
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)
Dt−1 + η
j
t;
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(
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)
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The FOC is:
1 −
(
1 + rt
)
+ F′
[
τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ)
(
ε − εt
)
+ D − D∗t
]
X = 0;
⇐⇒ rt = F′ [•] X.
(C3)
The second-order condition for a well-behaved max-
imization problem is satisfied because the manipulation
pushes the critical value of the F function below mean 0 (see
also Footnote 7). So the FOC determines the government’s
optimal deficit Dt
*.
APPENDIX D
The Implicit Function Theorem is used for obtaining
perturbation results, both for Proposition 1 in Section IV
and for the straightforward results referred to at the end of
Section III.
Derivatives with respect to any variable x of the FOC
around the optimal value Dt
* will be denoted
d dV
dDt
||||D∗t
dx
≕
VDtx. The derivations of the marginal effect of changes in
exogenous variables on the equilibrium value of the govern-
ment’s optimal choice of deficit Dt
* are specified below.
For Proposition 1:
dD∗t
dεt
= −
VDtεt
VDtDt
= −
τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ)F′′ [•]X
F′′ [•]X
= −τ ((1 − γ) φ + γ) > −1.(D1)
For the straightforward results referred to at the end of
Section III:
1. Government Cost Effect: Higher repayment costs rt
reduce the optimal government deficit at the equilibrium
(D2) (i)
dD∗t
drt
= −
VDtrt
VDtDt
< 0.
2. Government Benefit Effect: A higher ego rent X
increases the optimal government deficit at the equilibrium
(D3) (ii)
dD∗t
dX
= −
VDtX
VDtDt
> 0.
3. Leverage Effect: A higher tax rate τ decreases the
optimal government deficit at the equilibrium if there is a
boom, but increases it in case of a recession
(D4) (iii)
dD∗t
dτ
= −
VDtτ
VDtDt
< 0 if εt > 0;
(D5) (iv)
dD∗t
dτ
= −
VDtτ
VDtDt
> 0 if εt < 0.
As for result (i), if the cost of manipulating the govern-
ment deficit increases, the government will be more careful in
expanding fiscal latitude in order to gain an electoral advan-
tage. The effect of increasing the social costs of deficits is cap-
tured in the different setting of the Shi and Svensson (2006)
model, though not explicitly. As for result (ii), the incumbent
is willing to increase the manipulation if there is a larger ben-
efit from being reelected. This implies that the government
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accepts additional costs of producing a deficit. Despite the
model differences, such an effect of ego rents on manipula-
tions is also confirmed by Shi and Svensson (2006). Consider
now the last part of the aforementioned results ((iii) and (iv)).
As tax rate τ increases, the effect of an output shock is magni-
fied. If there is a recession (εt < 0), the government optimally
increases the deficit in order to offset the loss in fiscal latitude;
in case of a boom, the deficit is reduced. This leverage effect
is not captured in either Shi and Svensson (2006) or Lohmann
(1998).
APPENDIX E
This subsection presents the descriptive statistics of the
variables used in the empirical tests and some additional
empirical results, including those of robustness checks.
TABLE E1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Fiscal deficit (real euros per capita) 7,022 19.16 148.33 −1, 301.34 3, 955.61
Primary deficit (real euros per capita) 7,022 1.31 144.54 −1, 310.23 3, 616.92
Election year 7,022 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
GDP forecast (regional) 7,022 1.35 2.78 −9.46 8.98
Expected recession dummy 7,022 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Forecast <25th percentile 7,022 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Forecast <33th percentile 7,022 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dependency ratio 7,022 35.67 4.08 26.14 51.83
Population density 7,022 285.91 815.26 4.41 7, 865.82
Mayor left 7,022 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mayor independent 7,022 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Years mayor 7,022 8.38 6.41 1.00 37.00
Majority 7,022 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
GDP Forecast (regional)—IMF 7,022 1.58 3.02 −9.21 13.45
Unemployment rate forecast – Gov 5,205 6.51 2.68 −0.22 18.65
Unemployment rate forecast—IMF 5,222 6.51 2.68 −0.28 18.94
Sources: DGAL, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, INE, and IMF.
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TABLE E2
Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Growth
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Dummy
Forecast <25th
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Forecast<33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Without the control variables of vector X
Election year 48.349*** 19.898*** 23.277*** 17.536***
(10.392) (3.928) (4.701) (3.616)
Election year * expected recession −8.596*** 51.216*** 57.027*** 50.822***
(−5.301) (5.428) (5.608) (5.720)
Observations 7,031 7,031 7,031 7,031
R2 .083 .083 .083 .083
Controlling for time effects with 4-year mandate dummies
Election year 44.231*** 25.827*** 25.916*** 24.733***
(8.909) (5.147) (5.370) (5.153)
Election year * expected recession −5.905*** 31.956*** 48.049*** 29.687***
(−3.492) (3.208) (4.520) (3.183)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .085 .083 .085 .082
Controlling for time effects with a cubic time trend
Election year 51.277*** 25.936*** 28.186*** 24.170***
(10.860) (5.200) (5.883) (5.034)
Election year * expected recession −8.440*** 44.033*** 53.686*** 42.803***
(−5.162) (4.747) (5.295) (4.732)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .085 .081 .082 .081
Standard errors clustered by NUTS III region and year
Election year 48.312*** 20.225*** 23.432*** 17.750***
(9.829) (3.634) (4.368) (3.111)
Election year * expected recession −8.519*** 50.749*** 56.571*** 50.676***
(−4.257) (5.207) (5.039) (5.260)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .087 .086 .086 .086
Standard errors clustered by municipality
Election year 48.312*** 20.225*** 23.432*** 17.750***
(9.257) (3.926) (4.645) (3.261)
Election year * expected recession −8.519*** 50.749*** 56.571*** 50.676***
(−4.881) (5.475) (5.158) (5.196)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .087 .086 .086 .086
Notes: For each estimation, we indicate what differs relative to the baseline model of Table 3, which includes municipal
fixed-effects, a vector of control variables, 5-year period dummies, and bootstrap-corrected standard errors (based on 1,000
replications). Recession variable defined as indicated in the respective column title. T-statistics are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE E3
Sensitivity Analysis and Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Growth
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Dummy
Forecast <25th
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Forecast <33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Excluding 30 municipalities of Azores and Madeira
Election year 49.653∗∗∗ 22.437∗∗∗ 26.625∗∗∗ 20.286∗∗∗
(10.713) (4.953) (5.859) (4.367)
Election year * expected recession −8.064∗∗∗ 51.640∗∗∗ 54.279∗∗∗ 50.867∗∗∗
(−5.399) (5.999) (5.296) (6.028)
Observations 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332
R2 .091 .092 .091 .091
Excluding 100 municipalities for which average formula-determined grants are greater than 50% of total revenues
Election year 41.157∗∗∗ 11.354∗∗∗ 14.976∗∗∗ 10.700∗∗
(8.925) (2.644) (3.530) (2.397)
Election year * expected recession −8.432∗∗∗ 52.800∗∗∗ 56.281∗∗∗ 51.403∗∗∗
(−5.681) (5.946) (5.279) (6.073)
Observations 4,734 4,734 4,734 4,734
R2 .090 .090 .089 .090
Excluding observations after 2009 (period with binding term limits)
Election year 43.075∗∗∗ 19.085∗∗∗ 21.163∗∗∗ 16.380∗∗∗
(8.201) (3.933) (4.473) (3.482)
Election year * expected recession −7.467∗∗∗ 34.089∗∗∗ 44.115∗∗∗ 40.713∗∗∗
(−3.953) (3.179) (3.296) (4.076)
Observations 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482
R2 0.084 0.082 0.082 0.083
Excluding term-limited mayors
Election year 46.544∗∗∗ 21.573∗∗∗ 22.701∗∗∗ 18.657∗∗∗
(9.395) (4.172) (4.563) (3.794)
Election year * expected recession −7.915∗∗∗ 39.446∗∗∗ 50.839∗∗∗ 43.423∗∗∗
(−4.421) (4.000) (4.191) (4.721)
Observations 6,369 6,369 6,369 6,369
R2 .095 .092 .093 .093
Placebo test (using lagged expected recession)
Election year 42.458∗∗∗ 40.664∗∗∗ 40.467∗∗∗ 40.814∗∗∗
(8.244) (7.710) (7.783) (7.603)
Election year * expected recession −1.588 −8.211 −8.870 −8.834
(−1.019) (−0.722) (−0.717) (−0.819)
Observations 6,729 6,729 6,729 6,729
R2 .085 .083 .083 .084
Notes: The baseline model of Table 3 was used in all estimations. It includes a vector of control variables, municipal fixed-
effects, 5-year period dummies, and standard errors are clustered by region and year. Recession variable defined as indicated in
the respective column title. The sample restriction applied is indicated above the respective estimation results. T-statistics based
on bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE E4
Additional Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
or Fiscal Deficit
Growth
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Dummy
Forecast <25th
Percntile of
GDP Growth
Forecast <33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Primary deficit—Including the difference between actual and forecasted growth rates
Election year 48.334∗∗∗ 20.256∗∗∗ 23.425∗∗∗ 17.892∗∗∗
(10.150) (3.837) (4.644) (3.533)
Election year * expected recession −8.547∗∗∗ 50.670∗∗∗ 56.595∗∗∗ 50.382∗∗∗
(−5.106) (5.451) (5.492) (5.554)
GDP growth (forecast-actual) 0.060 −0.034 0.009 −0.170
(0.119) (−0.069) (0.017) (−0.341)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .087 .086 .086 .086
Using the fiscal deficit as dependent variable instead of the primary deficit
Election year 49.493∗∗∗ 22.964∗∗∗ 26.390∗∗∗ 20.514∗∗∗
(10.249) (4.248) (5.149) (3.963)
Election year * expected recession −8.086∗∗∗ 47.834∗∗∗ 51.501∗∗∗ 48.110∗∗∗
(−4.885) (5.088) (4.992) (5.233)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .095 .094 .094 .095
Regional GDP growth forecasts based on the IMF’s forecasts of national GDP growth
Primary deficit
Election year 51.856∗∗∗ 20.841∗∗∗ 25.215∗∗∗ 19.189∗∗∗
(9.471) (4.518) (5.745) (4.209)
Election year * expected recession −8.768∗∗∗ 54.007∗∗∗ 59.991∗∗∗ 52.649∗∗∗
(−5.584) (5.346) (4.497) (5.562)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .086 .086 .086 .086
Regional GDP growth forecasts based on the IMF’s forecasts of national GDP growth
Fiscal deficit
Election year 53.069∗∗∗ 22.770∗∗∗ 27.595∗∗∗ 21.228∗∗∗
(9.506) (5.004) (6.287) (4.678)
Election year * expected recession −8.388∗∗∗ 53.451∗∗∗ 57.219∗∗∗ 51.778∗∗∗
(−5.471) (5.344) (4.354) (5.456)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .095 .095 .095 .095
Notes: The dependent variable used is indicated above the respective estimation results. The baseline model of Table 3 was
used in all estimations. It includes a vector of control variables, municipal fixed-effects, 5-year period dummies, and standard
errors clustered by region and year. Recession variable defined as indicated in the respective column title. T-statistics based on
bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE E5
Interactions for Individual Election Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Primary
Deficit (in Real Euros p.c.)
Growth
Forecast
Expected
Recession
Dummy
Forecast <25th
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Forecast<33rd
Percentile of
GDP Growth
Expected recession 8.181*** −40.285*** −51.208*** −35.978***
(11.806) (−7.869) (−8.631) (−7.183)
1993 * Expected recession −7.120** 46.261*** 64.498*** 41.872***
(−2.395) (4.076) (5.813) (3.479)
1997 * Expected recession −9.845*** 16.005 28.166 36.956*
(−4.088) (0.934) (1.608) (1.958)
2001 * Expected recession 2.650 20.282 13.762 17.805
(0.521) (0.822) (0.401) (0.711)
2005 * Expected recession −14.008*** 105.238***
(−3.071) (3.475)
2009 * Expected recession −21.745** 79.353*** 89.057*** 57.373***
(−2.294) (3.257) (3.565) (2.660)
2013 * Expected recession −13.020* 74.888*** 94.502*** 73.318***
(−1.828) (2.832) (3.893) (2.639)
1993 31.477*** 3.746 1.347 3.427
(6.137) (0.451) (0.199) (0.378)
1997 52.740*** 27.565*** 29.334*** 25.677***
(6.391) (3.895) (4.146) (3.623)
2001 41.385*** 54.676*** 56.407*** 54.109***
(3.051) (5.511) (6.027) (5.469)
2005 62.857*** 24.606*** 26.483*** 17.855**
(4.375) (3.254) (3.530) (2.372)
2009 79.744*** 39.557** 49.171*** 47.458***
(7.075) (2.196) (3.325) (3.379)
2013 7.709 −34.583 −32.553 −38.351
(0.521) (−1.511) (−1.636) (−1.544)
Observations 7,022 7,022 7,022 7,022
R2 .077 .069 .071 .068
Wald p-value (interactions= 0) .0156 .000182 1.48e-06 .00110
Notes: The models include a vector of control variables, municipal fixed effects, year dummies (only the coefficients of those
that correspond to election years are shown), and standard errors are clustered by region and year. Recession variable defined as
indicated in the respective column title. T-statistics based on bootstrap-corrected standard errors (using 1,000 replications) are
in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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